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This paper examines the cyclical behavior of hours and wages in a unique panel
of 11 European countries, and documents signiﬁcant history dependence in wages.
Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job,
have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in pro-
ductivity, such as varying job quality, or match-speciﬁc productivity are not likely
to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual
arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining
practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with one-
sided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong
unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by
full-commitment insurance contracts.
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1Understanding the process of wage formation is central to evaluating the empirical
performance of equilibrium models of the labor market. Most models in macroeconomics
assume that the behavior of wages over the business cycle reﬂect movements in contem-
poraneous productivity (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Long and Plosser, 1983; Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1994). Nevertheless, evidence from micro-data shows that wages display
signiﬁcant history dependence, a feature that is considered to be at odds with the spot
market model of wages. In particular, using data from the U.S. labor market, Beaudry
and DiNardo (1991) (BD hereon), ﬁnd that a worker’s wage depends crucially on the
history of economic conditions during his tenure on the job, and that the contempora-
neous conditions are irrelevant when history dependence is accounted for.1 This pattern
was considered to be in line with a contractual market where employers and workers
are engaged in long-term contracts to insure workers against temporary drops in their
productivity (Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975).2
The BD methodology has been applied in a relatively limited number of country-
speciﬁc studies. Nevertheless, the evidence outside the North American markets remains
mixed and inconclusive. McDonald and Worswick (1999) conﬁrm the relevance of im-
plicit contracts for Canada and Macis (2006) for Italy, while studies for Australia (Seltzer
and Merrett, 2000), Britain (Devereux and Hart, 2007), Finland (Kilponen and Santavita,
2010) and Germany (Vilhubert, 1999) argue otherwise. This is puzzling, because, in many
ways, the European style labor markets are more conducive to contractual arrangements
compared to the U.S. The tighter labor regulations, along with the strong presence of la-
bor unions in some countries, facilitate the enforceability of wage contracts (Hogan, 2001).
In addition, the limited turnover relative to the U.S. increases the expected duration of an
employment relationship, raising the potential welfare gains from long-term contracts.
In this paper, by exploiting a unique data set for a panel of European countries, we are
able to get a better idea of the relevance of implicit wage contracts, and address a variety
of issues recently raised against the existing studies. In particular, we conduct a more
robust test of contractual effects based on the behavior of wages over the business cycle,
and reinforce our ﬁndings by examining whether the joint behavior of hours and wages
1Grant (2003) conﬁrms these ﬁndings in an extended sample for U.S. See also Kudlyak (2010) for a
similar result.
2See Rosen (1985) for a survey of the implicit contracts literature.
2is consistent with the theory of implicit insurance contracts. The upshot of our paper is
that we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant role for contracts in Europe.
We begin our analysis by applying the standard BD methodology to Europe. We
regress a worker’s wage rate on the current unemployment rate in his country of resi-
dence, the initial unemployment rate at the start of the job, and the best unemployment
rate since the start of the job, controlling for individual productivity characteristics. Since,
in contractual markets, wages contain information on the economic conditions when the
contract was (re)negotiated, the relevance of past unemployment rates has been consid-
ered as evidence for implicit contracts. We tackle two issues that cloud this interpretation.
First, such history dependence could also reﬂect unobserved, match-speciﬁc produc-
tivity differences among jobs that are created during different phases of the business cy-
cle (Okun, 1973). For instance, Bowlus (1995) shows that jobs that start during recessions
have shorter expected duration, indicating a lower match quality. More recently, Hage-
dorn and Manovskii (2010) argue that the empirical patterns in Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991) are also consistent with a spot market model with heterogeneous match quality
and endogenous quits. We address this concern in two ways. First, we directly control
for measures of match quality. Second, we focus on the wage growth of workers who do
not change jobs between two consecutive periods. If the match-speciﬁc productivity is
time-invariant, this eliminates the potential biases that are due to the changing composi-
tion of job quality over the business cycle (Bellou and Kaymak, 2010).
Second, in a single country study, the estimates of contracting effects are identiﬁed by
the co-variation over time of wages and the aggregate unemployment rate. This can lead
to multicollinearity problems in BD type regressions unless the data spans a sufﬁciently
long time period with several cohorts of workers, a feature missing in most studies. Our
data spans a relatively short period of time, but by employing a panel of countries, we are
able to pursue a more robust identiﬁcation strategy, which relies on the variation in wages
and unemployment within a country over time for several countries. We are also able to
control for arbitrary time effects in wages for Europe, which is infeasible at a country
level.
Next, we seek evidence for the presence of contracts by studying the behavior of hours
over the business cycle, and provide an estimate of the elasticity of intertemporal labor
3supply for Europe.3 When hours are part of the negotiation, the welfare maximizing con-
tract aims to provide a constant utility ﬂow to the worker by varying wage payments
along with working hours, hence, leisure. Our test relies on the cross-sectional variation
in wages conditional on productivity, a distinct characteristic of contractual markets. For
instance, a worker who was hired in an expansion, makes more than an identical worker
who was hired in the subsequent recession, because the former was insured against a pos-
sible downfall in productivity prior to the recession. Since both workers have the same
productivity, a higher wage rate constitutes a pure income effect, and, therefore must be
accompanied by a fall in hours if leisure is a normal good (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1995).
In a spot market model, on the other hand, any variation in the wage rate reﬂects pro-
ductivity differences, and, therefore, leads to both income and substitution effects. This
mitigates the correlation between hours and wages, and can generate a positive correla-
tion instead. We test for this prediction by projecting the changes in hours on changes in
the contractual variation in wages using a two-step procedure.
Our main ﬁnding is that implicit contracts overall play a signiﬁcant role in the deter-
mination of wages in Europe. This is robust to unobserved differences in match quality,
which appear to be important components of wages but do not affect our main conclu-
sions regarding the importance of past labor market conditions on wages. Despite the
statistical strength of our results, we ﬁnd that the elasticity of wages to past unemploy-
ment rates is dampened relative to the reported estimates for the U.S.
Moreover, we show that hours worked respond negatively to differences in wages
that arise due to disparities in contractual terms, a result consistent with the presence
of risk-sharing agreements. The estimated intertemporal elasticity of substitution in our
preferred speciﬁcation is -0.20, which is slightly lower than the estimates in Beaudry and
DiNardo (1995) for the U.S., consistent with some of the existing estimates for Europe.
Finally, the ECHP provides useful information on whether the employment relation-
ship of a respondent is covered by an explicit contract. By combining this unique feature
with variation in the institutional factors across European countries, we are also able to
provide valuable insights for the interaction of such factors with insurance contracts, and
3Although the implications of implicit contracts for wage movements have been extensively studied,
much less attention has been spent on the implications for hours with the notable exceptions of Abowd and
Card (1987) and Beaudry and DiNardo (1995).
4test whether the theory of implicit contracts is a good description of wages governed by
explicit contracts in the data.
While our tests indicate strong contractual effects for workers who are reportedly on a
long term employment contract, we ﬁnd that the nature of the contract depends crucially
on the strength of labor unions and the centralization of the bargaining process in the
country. In countries with strong unions and centralized bargaining practices, wages
depend signiﬁcantly on the unemployment rate at the start of the job in support of a
contractual model with full commitment by both workers and employers. In countries
with decentralized bargaining, our ﬁndings are consistent with contracts that are binding
on the employer, but not on the worker. Not surprisingly, our ﬁndings for workers who
have short-term, casual jobs without an explicit contract, indicate that wages are much
more responsive to the current economic conditions, and past markets have no effects on
their wages.
In the next section, we discuss our empirical speciﬁcation. Section 2 describes our
data, and section 3 presents our results. Section 4 concludes.
1 Empirical Methodology
Following Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), we estimate a wage regression that nests three
different models of wage determination. The general economic conditions are approx-
imated by the unemployment rate in each country. The real wage at each period is
projected on the contemporaneous unemployment rate (spot market model), the unem-
ployment rate at the start of the employment relationship (full-commitment risk-sharing
model), and the minimum unemployment rate since the start of the job (one-sided lack of
commitment with worker mobility). Our speciﬁcation is:
lnwict = b1Uct + b2U0
ic + b3Umin
ict + b4Xict + qt + mc + di + #ict (1)
where i, c, t index individual, country and time respectively; lnwict is the current log-real
wage rate for individual i; Uct is the contemporaneous unemployment rate in country
c; U0
ic is the unemployment rate when worker i started his job in country c; Umin
ict is the
minimum unemployment rate between the start year of the job and year t. X is a vector of
5covariates. qt is a vector of indicators for survey years, mc for country and di for individual
ﬁxed effects. #ict is a random error term.
The spot market model is consistent with b1 < 0 and b2 = b3 = 0, i.e. wages depend
only on contemporaneous conditions. In a full-commitment risk-sharing model, the op-
timal wage contract features a ﬁxed wage, which equals the expected productivity of the
worker at the time the contract was signed. Since both parties fully commit, wage is not
renegotiated. This is consistent with b2 < 0 and b1 = b3 = 0. When the contract is
binding on the ﬁrm, but the worker can change employers, the optimal contract features
a downward rigid wage with raises whenever the economic conditions improve (Harris
and Holmstrom, 1982). Then, wages reﬂect the best economic conditions that the worker
ever experienced. This can be tested by b3 < 0 and b1 = b2 = 0.
Our speciﬁcation does not exhaust all possible contractual designs. For instance, we
exclude contracts which enslave the worker, but are non-binding on the ﬁrm. These con-
tracts predict wages that are rigid upwards, with occasional wage cuts whenever the
employer ﬁnds a better worker. Wages, in this case, can be summarized by the maximum
unemployment rate since the start of the job. Also not captured in (1) are arrangements
when neither the employer nor the worker can credibly commit to the employment rela-
tionship. In this case, the optimal contract foresees sluggish wage adjustments including
wage cuts as well as raises whenever the cyclical shocks are large (Thomas and Worrall,
1988). Such contracts cannot be captured by any extremum moments, such as the mini-
mum or the maximum unemployment rate.4 We relax these restrictions when we study
the co-movement of hours and wages below.
The additional control variables are cubic polynomials in age and tenure, indicators
for the industry classiﬁcation of the job, indicators for the region within the country.
We use the cubic polynomial in age as a proxy for the labor market experience. Tenure
captures the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. Because the minimum unem-
ployment rate is correlated with tenure by construction, including a cubic polynomial in
tenure is essential in order to account for possible nonlinearities in the effect of tenure on
wages that could be inaccurately absorbed by the minimum unemployment rate.
4Despite the lack of a theoretical underpinning, it has become common practice to include the maximum
unemploymentratein(1). Whilethemaximumunemploymentmaycapturesomeofthevariationinwages,
the coefﬁcients do not have a meaningful interpretation.
6The set of industry dummies corrects for varying industry composition at different
phasesofthebusinesscycle(Okun,1973). Individualﬁxedeffectscontrolfortime-invariant
productivity characteristics. They also capture the shifts in the composition of unob-
servedworkercharacteristicsoverthebusinesscycle(Bils,1985;Solon, Barsky, andParker,
1994). If, for instance, low productivity workers are hired primarily during expansions,
then wages are negatively correlated with the economic conditions at the start of the job,
which would tend to attenuate the coefﬁcient on the initial unemployment rate.
The existing studies typically estimate (1) with a linear time trend. Since we observe
workers with different employment histories in various countries over time, we can con-
trol for time-speciﬁc intercepts without jeopardizing the identiﬁcation of the contempora-
neous unemployment rate in a country. In addition, we include country dummies to cap-
ture cross-country variations in unemployment rates and wages, so that the identiﬁcation
oftheparametersofinterest(b1, b2, b3)essentiallystemsfromvariationinunemployment
and wages within a country over time for several countries.
We also extend our analysis to test if the behavior of hours worked is consistent with
contracting arrangements that specify variable working hours along with wages. In this
case, the optimal contract aims to provide a constant utility ﬂow to the worker by vary-
ing wage payments along with working hours, and thereby, leisure. The approach that
we employ is based on the cross-sectional covariation of contracted hours and wages
conditional on productivity. The key to our test is the variation in wages conditional on
productivity, which arises naturally in contractual markets. For instance, a worker who
was hired in an expansion, makes more than a worker who was hired in a subsequent re-
cession, because the former was insured against a possible downfall in productivity prior
to the recession. Since both workers have the same productivity, a higher wage rate con-
stitutes a pure income effect, and, hence must be accompanied by a fall in hours if leisure
is a normal good (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1995).
In a spot market model, on the other hand, wages equal marginal product at all times.
Consequently, any variation in the wage rate necessarily represents a variation in produc-
tivity, and, therefore, generates both an income and a substitution effect. This mitigates
the correlation between hours and wages, and can generate a positive correlation instead.
To test for the negative correlation between hours and wages, conditional on produc-
7tivity, we regress the change in hours worked on wage growth:
Dkhict = a1Dklnwict + a2DXict + nict (2)
When good measures of productivity are not available, estimation of (2) requires a set
of instruments for wage growth that are uncorrelated with productivity growth. In con-
tractual markets, wages display strong history dependence, and indicators for past labor
market conditions are a natural set of instruments. Following Bellou and Kaymak (2010),
we use a full interaction of job start year and lagged year indicators, I(t0  t   k), to cap-
ture the contractual variation in wages. We include a full set of lagged year and current
year interactions, I(t   k  t), in the main regression to control for changes in contem-
poraneous conditions, and to ensure that the contractual variation in wage growth is
identiﬁed only by prior labor market conditions.5 This speciﬁcation encompasses differ-
ent types of contracts, including, for instance, when the contracting arrangements are not
fully binding on workers and employers.
2 The European Community Household Panel
The data comes from the 1994 - 2001 waves of the European Community Household Sur-
vey (ECHP). ECHP is a harmonized longitudinal survey of a set of European countries.
Householdsandindividualsareinterviewedonanannualbasisandprovideawiderange
of information regarding their labor market conditions. Although it is a relatively short
panel (33 quarters), respondents provide retrospective information on their jobs. For the
ﬁrst wave of individuals, who are subsequently followed in later years, the earliest re-
ported job-starting date is 1981. Therefore, we effectively exploit variation within and
across countries in unemployment between 1981 and 2001.
For our analysis, we restrict the sample to men of ages 21 to 60 who work full-time
(30+ hours a week), in the private sector. Multiple job holders are excluded. The appendix
provides a more detailed description of the data and lists further sample restrictions. The
selection criteria are chosen so that the sample is comparable to those used in similar
5This speciﬁcation is slightly different than Beaudry and DiNardo (1995), who use start year indicators
and changes in start year indicators. While the results are similar, our speciﬁcation is more general, and
captures more of the variation in wages.
8studies. In total, we observe approximately 25,000 individuals who contribute 92,800
person-year observations. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the core variables
used in the study.
Figure 1 depicts the trajectory of unemployment rates since 1981 for each of the coun-
tries comprising our sample. This ﬁgure essentially describes the variation we exploit
for the identiﬁcation of the baseline parameters. As is evident, there is considerable vari-
ability in unemployment both within and across countries through time. In 1981, the
ﬁrst observation year in the sample, the unemployment rate varied from as low as 2.5%
in Austria to as high as 14% in Spain. Moreover, the cyclicality of unemployment var-
ied signiﬁcantly from one country to another with Portugal, for instance, experiencing
multiple distinct recessionary and expansionary periods and the Netherlands having a
consistently falling unemployment rate throughout the sample period.
3 Contracts and Wages in Europe
Table 2 presents the main results of the paper. The coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 to
facilitate the interpretation of the baseline effects. The ﬁrst column projects wages only on
the contemporaneous unemployment rate. Real wages display a clear procyclical pattern.
A one percent increase in the national unemployment rate leads to a 1.7% fall in the real
wage rate. This is very close to existing estimates for the U.S labor market in magnitude.
Bils (1985), for instance, reports an estimate of 1.6%.
The importance of current economic conditions is considerably reduced when indica-
tors of past labor market conditions are introduced in the following columns. The effect is
most dramatic when we introduce the minimum unemployment rate since the beginning
of the job, where the coefﬁcient of the contemporaneous unemployment rate declines
by more than half to 0.70%. On the other hand, the initial unemployment rate and the
minimum unemployment rate have signiﬁcant predictive power for current wages. The
coefﬁcients are -1.0% and -1.3%, when included separately.
In the last column, we let the three theories compete by simply including all indica-
tors of economic conditions in the same speciﬁcation. All three measures are statistically
signiﬁcant. A one percent higher unemployment rate when the job started is associated
with0.6% lowerwages. Thiseffect isadditionally ampliﬁedif theworker hasexperienced
9more favorable conditions during her career on the job. A percentage point increase in
the minimum unemployment rate leads to a 0.8% reduction in the current wage. Con-
ditional on past labor market conditions, a one-percentage point decline in the current
unemployment rate is associated with an approximately 0.8% increase in wages.
Overall, the results in table 2 suggest that contracts, following the BD interpretation,
are important and quantitatively at least as relevant as the spot market in the determi-
nation of wages. Although contracts play an important role in wage determination in
Europe, this effect is not nearly as large as in U.S. For instance, Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991) and Grant (2003) provide estimates in the neighborhood of -2.5% for the minimum
unemployment rate.
3.1 Explicit versus implicit contracts
In this subsection, we investigate whether the behavior of wages for workers with explicit
job contracts is consistent with implicit insurance contracts. To this end, we look at two
sets of workers: those who are reportedly covered by a permanent or a ﬁxed term contract
with a duration of one year or more, and those who do not have a wage contract. The
latter group contains mainly workers who undertake seasonal or casual jobs without an
explicit contractual arrangement.
Table 3 presents our results. The ﬁrst column shows the benchmark estimation results
for workers without an explicit contract. The current unemployment rate has a sizable
coefﬁcient of -3.6%, whereas past labor market conditions are not statistically relevant.
This is consistent with the spot market being the main determinant of wages of workers
under no explicit contracts, though it should be noted that only a small group of workers
are in this category.
Turning to workers under explicit contracts, the results closely mirror our earlier ﬁnd-
ings. Past labor market conditions play a signiﬁcant role in wage determination. Wages
also adjust to current economic conditions, however, suggesting that contracts are more
ﬂexible than the simple insurance contracts with one-sided commitment.
We suspect that the results based on the sample of covered workers might be affected
by the underlying heterogeneity among countries regarding their intensity of unionism
and the degree of centralization of the wage determination process. Theoretically, the
10impact of unions on the presence of implicit contracts could go either way. On one hand,
it was argued that unions may constitute an enforcing mechanism of existing contractual
arrangements (Hogan, 2001). In that sense, one might anticipate that in countries where
unions are more prevalent, implicit contracting should be stronger. Grant (2003) using
U.S data ﬁnds that implicit contracts are indeed more prevalent in the unionized sectors.
Nevertheless, the structure of unions in the U.S. is considerably different compared to
Europe. In particular, the difference between union membership and union coverage6 can
be substantial in Europe, whereas it is negligible in the US. Furthermore, the bargaining
process in the U.S. is mostly decentralized, perhaps with the exception of the auto indus-
try. On the contrary, in Europe, it is common to see industry-wide collective agreements.
Both of these factors can inﬂuence how wage contracts are written.
To see this, we ﬁrst divide our sample of countries in two categories: those with a cen-
tralized collective bargaining system and those with a more decentralized wage setting
mechanism.7 For a country to belong in the ﬁrst category, the union coverage rate should
be at least 50% and the country’s score on the level of wage setting should be at least 0.5
over 1.8 In other words, a country should simultaneously display a relatively high degree
of unionization and centralization in the wage setting process. In our sample, these coun-
tries are Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Italy. Next, for each category, we re-estimate the
speciﬁcation in (1).
The last two columns in Table 3 show the estimation results. In the set of countries
with a highly centralized collective bargaining system, the current unemployment rate
does not have an effect on wages. The initial unemployment rate, on the other hand, has a
signiﬁcant effect on current wages. Workers that start their jobs when the unemployment
rate is 1 percent elevated, accept 1% lower wage rates. The minimum unemployment
rate, by contrast, does not play an important role in wage determination.
That union wages do not display spot market behavior is not surprising considering
that union contracts are usually not state-dependent, and they cover several years at a
time. Our ﬁndings indicate that the wage rate for new workers is not rigid, but reﬂects
6Workers whose wages are governed by a collective agreement.
7Unfortunately, the ECHP does not report the union status of a worker.
8Both the union coverage statistics and the index of the centralization of wage bargaining are provided
by Wallerstein and Western (2008) (Table 1, pg. 215, and Table 3, pg.224). Authors use data from various
sources. See references therein.
11the conditions at the time of the hire. The observed wage pattern is consistent with full
commitment contracts, which may not be too far from reality, since most workers in this
category have reportedly permanent job contracts. It is, however, at odds with Tayloristic
contracting models that impose rigidity on the wages of new hires, a feature that is crucial
in amplifying the volatility of employment over the business cycle (Gertler and Trigari,
2009).
The subsequent wage raises once a worker is hired are independent of the general
economic conditions. This implies that wages are not renegotiated in response to changes
in the outside options of individual workers. This is expected since wage raises are likely
negotiated across the board, independently of when a worker was hired. This completely
separates the start year effects from wage growth within in a job spell and from current
year effects, if any.
The last column reports our ﬁndings for the set of countries with decentralized bar-
gaining. Wages in these countries respond most to the minimum unemployment rate,
then to the current unemployment rate, but not the initial unemployment rate. We con-
sider these results to be indicative of the presence of contractual arrangements, that re-
semble one-sided insurance contracts.
3.2 Cyclical composition of job quality
The main conclusion from the analysis performed to this point is that both spot and im-
plicit contract models characterize the movement of real wages over the business cycle in
Europe. However, the baseline estimates could be biased because they do not account for
the potentially confounding effect of match-speciﬁc productivity. As suggested recently
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010), the observed importance of past labor market con-
ditions could be due to cyclical selection of unobserved match quality. In particular, if
wage offers are procyclical, then when times are good and jobs are plenty, only the best
job matches survive as workers in weaker matches leave their jobs in pursuit of better
employment opportunities. Since differences in match quality are not directly observable
to the researcher, they are captured by indicators of past economic conditions, hence the
history of dependence in wages.
To control for cyclical changes in the composition of jobs, we supplement our base-
12line speciﬁcation with two measures of match quality: the total job duration of a job (or
completed tenure), and the average unemployment rate over the duration of the match.
The ﬁrst measure captures the idea that jobs that last longer reﬂect on average high-
productivity matches. The second reﬂects the idea that such selection is more stringent
during expansions, when vacancies are plenty. A job that survived an expansion is, on
average, more productive than the one that only survived a recession. The two measures
reﬂect the difference between the quantity and the quality of the time survived by the
match.
Table 4 presents the results. The duration of a job is a strong predictor of the wage.
A job that eventually lasts an additional year is associated with an average of 0.8-1.0%
higher wage rate during the entire duration of the job. The inclusion of job duration in
the regression decreases the coefﬁcient on the minimum unemployment rate from 0.8%
to 0.6%. This is consistent with the ﬁnding that jobs that start during a recession are, in
general, shorter (Bowlus, 1995). The average unemployment rate, on the other hand, does
not do a good job of capturing job quality.9
The additional variables we use are imperfect measures of match quality. Our alterna-
tive strategy to control for changes in average job quality over the business cycle is to run
the benchmark regression in differences using only the workers who do not change jobs.
This method automatically eliminates any time-invariant match characteristic.10
When we regress real wage growth on the change in the contemporaneous unemploy-
ment rate alone, we ﬁnd that wages of job stayers are slightly procyclical. A one percent
increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 0.7% reduction in wages. This is lower than
the coefﬁcient of -1.7% in the ﬁrst column of Table 2, consistent with the hypothesis that
the cyclicality of wages stems mostly from wages of new hires. Nevertheless, when we in-
cludethechangeintheminimumunemploymentrate, theelasticityofwageswithrespect
to the contemporaneous unemployment rate decreases to -0.4%, and becomes statistically
insigniﬁcant. Meanwhile, the coefﬁcient on the change in the minimum unemployment
9Total job duration is truncated from above for most of the jobs in our sample since they are not com-
pleted. We have also estimated our results with the sample of jobs that were completed. The ﬁndings
are similar, if not more favorable for contracting effects. The minimum unemployment rate is persistently
signiﬁcant albeit all estimates have higher standard errors due to the considerable reduction in sample size.
10Bellou and Kaymak (2010) use a similar strategy to distinguish between the spot market model and the
contractual model in the US.
13rate is -0.8%, virtually equal to the estimate in the last column of Table 2. This implies that
the history dependence that we detected in the benchmark speciﬁcation is not an artifact
of cyclical selection of match quality.
In a way, this result is not surprising, since the coefﬁcient of the change in the min-
imum unemployment rate is mostly identiﬁed during recessions, when job-to-job tran-
sitions are not common. The arguments raised in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010), on
the other hand, rely heavily on workers who switch into high quality jobs, which is more
likely to take place during booms.
3.3 Are hours consistent with implicit contracts?
In this section, we turn our focus to hours worked instead of the wage rate. Although the
empirical studies of contracting models using wage data are widely available, less atten-
tion has been paid to the cyclical behavior of hours within in the context of contractual
models.
The baseline model of wage contracts can be easily extended to allow for variable
hours. In this case, the optimal contract will not only specify a history dependent pro-
ﬁle for wages but also a contingent proﬁle for hours worked (Beaudry and DiNardo,
1995). The welfare maximizing insurance contract with variable hours aims to provide
a constant ﬂow of utility subject to participation constraints of employers and workers.
This involves transfers either in terms of wages or in terms of leisure. The optimal con-
tract achieves allocative efﬁciency by setting the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure to the marginal product. The wage rate, however, deviates tem-
porarily from the marginal product to insure the worker.
In contractual models workers that are hired at different times can be paid at differ-
ent rates conditional on productivity. This arises due to differences in contractual terms.
Since the productivity is the same, a higher wage rate must be associated with decreased
hours to maintain the equality between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal
product. Therefore, hours are negatively related to wages in contractual markets. This is
the empirical test we wish to conduct.
Our strategy is to regress changes in hours worked on the change in the wage rate. It
is essential, however, to detach the variation in wages that is coming from differences in
14contractualterms, andnotfromdifferencesinproductivity. Weachievethisbyusingafull
set of interactions of start year and current year indicators as instruments for wages. The
interaction variables capture the entire history of economic conditions while on the job
and, hence, all possible contractual arrangements, including those with two-sided lack of
commitment.11 We control for differences in cubic polynomials of age and tenure, and in-
dicators for industry, country, region within the country, and a country speciﬁc indicator
for job switchers. To control for the contemporaneous changes in the economic environ-
ment, we also include a full set of interactions of the current year and the lagged year
indicators. This ensures that the variation in wage growth captured by our instruments
represents truly the past labor market conditions. In a contractual market, variations in
wages due to past labor market conditions constitute a pure income effect, leading to a
negative correlation between hours and wages. The estimated coefﬁcient is simply the
intertemporal elasticity of labor supply.
There is signiﬁcant history dependence in wage growth in Europe. The Wald test of
our instruments in the ﬁrst step yields a statistic of 49.1. This rules out any concerns for
weak identiﬁcation. We estimate the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply for workers
with explicit contracts to be -0.29 (with a standard error of 0.07). This is larger than most
of the existing estimates for European males.12 The comparable elasticity estimate for US,
as provided in Beaudry and DiNardo (1995), is -0.34.
Our benchmark estimate includes a country-speciﬁc switcher dummy to control for
possible changes in job quality. Since we had a sufﬁciently large dataset, we also esti-
mated the model using job stayers only. By focusing on changes within job spells, we
control for changes in the cyclical composition of match-speciﬁc productivity characteris-
tics that are time-invariant. This yields an elasticity of -0.20, with a standard error of 0.07,
which indicates that hours are more responsive to wage adjustments for switchers.13
Overall, our estimates show a signiﬁcant negative correlation between contractual
11Beaudry and DiNardo (1995) employ start year dummies and differences in start year dummies as
instruments. While the results are similar with their speciﬁcation, using full set of interactions provides a
more robust identiﬁcation strategy and, hence, efﬁciency gains.
12See Table 1 in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a survey of elasticity estimates.
13Since we have data from multiple countries, we also estimated our model using interactions of the
start year and lagged year with the country of residence as instruments for wage growth. The elasticity in
this case is identiﬁed by variation in wage growth that is dependent on the country-speciﬁc labor market
history. The estimates are very similar with slightly lower standard errors.
15hours and wages. This ﬁnding is robust across different samples and methods we con-
sider. Our preferred estimate is -0.20. This is comparable to some of the earlier estimates
of the labor supply elasticities that exploit the peculiarities of the tax structure in Britain
(Blundell and Walker, 1986; Blundell et al., 1988) and Netherlands (van Soest, Woittiez,
and Kapteyn, 1990).14
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the elasticity is small, especially compared to US. To
see the economic signiﬁcance of this estimate, consider a two-percentage point fall in the
unemployment as the economy exits a recessionary period. This drop, according to the
estimates of table 2 (column 4), is related to a 1.62% increase in the wage of a worker hired
during the recession relative to a new hire. Suppose now that the wage increase is not
associated with a productivity boost. Then, based on the preferred elasticity estimate, the
1.62% increase in the wage rate will induce an approximate 0.32% reduction in the weekly
hours worked. Given the average of 43.6 hours per week in our sample, this amounts to
a reduction of work time by 7 hours annually for an employee working 50 weeks per
year. This is less than a regular workday of extra vacation time. The equivalent effect of a
two-percentage point fall in unemployment for the U.S economy would be an extra 3 to
5 days of vacation, which is more sizable.
4 Conclusion
Using longitudinal data on 11 European countries, we present evidence that is consis-
tent with the presence of strong contractual effects in wages. We show that past labor
market conditions are signiﬁcant predictors of current wages, but the effect is smaller
compared to the range of estimates available for the U.S labor market. Since we also ﬁnd
that the contemporaneous unemployment rate has an independent and signiﬁcant effect
on wages, we cannot rule out the spot market models completely.
Our analysis of workers with explicit contracts provides crucial insights to the wage
determination process in Europe. In countries with strong labor unions and centralized
bargaining practices, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant time of entry effects, consistent with full com-
mitment insurance contracts. By contrast, wages do not respond to contemporaneous
economic conditions, and wage raises do not reﬂect changes in workers’ outside options.
14See Table 2 in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a list of estimates in the literature.
16For economies where the wage bargaining is decentralized, we ﬁnd that the wage behav-
ior is consistent with contractual models that are binding on the employer, but not on the
worker.
Our study of hours worked indicates a negative correlation between the contractual
variation in wages and weekly hours worked, which delivers additional evidence in sup-
port of the contractual functioning of the European labor market.
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A Data
Data comes from the 1994-2001 waves of the European Community Household Survey
(ECHP). The countries included in the analysis are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
19France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. Sweden was
excludedsinceECHPonlycontainscross-sectionaldataonthiscountry. Luxembourgwas
also excluded from the analysis since a large fraction of its workers reside outside the
country, rendering the national unemployment rate an irrelevant measure of workers’
outside options. The sample is restricted to men of ages 21 to 60 who work with an
employer in the private sector for at least 30 hours a week. Workers with multiple jobs
are excluded.
Hourly wage rate is calculated as the gross monthly wage and salary income divided
by four times the usual weekly hours reported by the respondent. All wage data was
converted to 2000 values using the national CPI of each country, and then converted to
British pounds using PPP adjusted conversion rates provided in the ECHP country ﬁles.
This ensures cross-country comparability of wages without incorporating exchange rate
ﬂuctuations over time between countries.
The respondents in the ECHP report the beginning year of their jobs back to 1981. Jobs
that began before 1981 were coded into one category by the ECHP, and therefore dropped
from our sample. Job tenure is measured as the difference between the interview year
and the beginning year of a worker’s job. For all jobs that began after 1993, the ECHP also
reported the month of the year when they started working. A job switch was identiﬁed
as a change in the beginning month/year of a worker’s job between two consecutive
interviews. All observations with apparent inconsistencies, such as when the beginning
year goes back in time, were dropped.
Information on region of residence was aggregated to single digits in UK. Missing
observations were assigned to ﬁrst regions in Finland and Portugal (based on our analysis
of the longitudinal nature of the missing data), but separate region indicators for Belgium,
France, Italy and Spain. Denmark, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands were considered
as a single region each.
Unemployment rates were taken from OECD database. Current unemployment rate
is the quarterly unemployment rate at the time of the interview. For calculation of the
minimum unemployment rate, quarterly unemployment rate was used whenever infor-
mation on the beginning month of the job was available. The annual rate was substituted
otherwise.
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Income (log) 2.3 0.6
Weekly hours 43.6 7.9
Number of workers 25,060
Number of observations 92,863
Note.— Data comes from the European Community Household Panel (1994 - 2001). Sample includes full-
time, private sector workers of ages 21 to 64.
21Table 2: Real Wages and Unemployment in Europe
Dependent Variable: lnwijt
Ut -1.69 -1.30 -0.70 -0.84






Obs. 92,863 92,863 92,863 92,863
Note .— Ut is contemporanous unemployment rate, Ut0 is the unemployment rate at the start of the job
and Umin is the minimum unemployment rates since the start of the job. All speciﬁcations also control
for individual ﬁxed effects, cubic polynomials in tenure and age, indicators for industry, survey years,
countries and regions within a country. Data comes from the European Community Household Panel (1994
- 2001). Sample includes full-time, private sector workers of ages 21 to 64. Standard errors are clustered by
individual.
, statistically signiﬁcant at 5% and 1%.
22Table 3: Real Wages and Unemployment for Workers with Explicit Con-
tracts
Dependent Variable: hourly wage rate (logs)
Permanent/Fixed Term Contracts
Casual/Seasonal Collective Decentralized
Jobs All Bargaining Bargaining
Ut -3.60 -0.86 -0.22 -0.74
(1.42) (0.23) (0.34) (0.27)
Ut0 -1.67 -0.65 -1.03  -0.40
(1.22) (0.29) (0.47) (0.34)
Umin
t 2.05 -0.64 0.84 -1.12
(1.93) (0.29) (0.44) (0.34)
Obs. 4,541 71,260 22,964 48,296
Note .— Ut is contemporanous unemployment rate, Ut0 is the unemployment rate at the start of the job
and Umin is the minimum unemployment rate since the start of the job. All speciﬁcations also control for
individualﬁxedeffects, cubicpolynomialsintenureandage, indicatorsforindustry, surveyyears, countries
and regions within a country. Data is taken from the European Community Household Panel (1994 - 2001).
Sample includes men of ages 21 to 64 who work full-time in the private sector. Standard errors are clustered
by individual.Countries with centralized bargaining systems are Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Italy.
, statistically signiﬁcant at 5% and 1%.
23Table4: RealWagesandUnemployment: ControllingforMatchQuality
Dependent Variable: lnwijt
Ut -0.84 -0.91 -0.99 -1.00
(0.20 ) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Ut0 -0.60 -0.58 -0.54 -0.67
(0.25) (0.25) (0.29) (0.28)
Umin
t -0.81 -0.66 -0.70 -0.61
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)




t0 Ut/100 -0.06 0.11
(0.06) (0.07)
Obs. 92,863 92,863 92,863 92,863
Note .— Ut is contemporaneous unemployment rate, Ut0 is the unemployment rate at the start of the job
and Umin is the minimum unemployment rates since the start of the job. Match quality is measured by
the total duration of the job and the sum of unemployment rates during the entire duration of the job. All
speciﬁcations also control for individual ﬁxed effects, cubic polynomials in tenure and age, indicators for
industry, survey years, countries and regions within a country. Data comes from the European Community
Household Panel (1994 - 2001). Sample includes men of ages 21 - 64 who work full-time in the private
sector. Standard errors are clustered by individual.
, statistically signiﬁcant at 5% and 1%.







Note .— DkUt and DkUmin are the changes in the contemporaneous unemployment rate and the minimum
unemployment rate since the start of the job. All speciﬁcations also control for differences in cubic polyno-
mials in tenure and age, indicators for industry, countries and regions within a country. Data is taken from
the European Community Household Panel (1994 - 2001). Sample includes men of ages 21 to 64 who work
full-time in the private sector. Standard errors are clustered by individual.
24Figure 1: The rate of unemployment in Europe: 1981 - 2002
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